Rwanda’s Forever President

kagame-fpr-bureau-politiqueANTWERP, Belgium — There is an election in Rwanda on Friday, but its outcome already is nearly certain: President Paul Kagame will win a third seven-year term. Elections there are not a contest for power. They are the ritual confirmation of the power in place.

Mr. Kagame generally wins by margins that would make a dictator proud: In 2010, he scored some 93 percent of the vote. He is the only ruler most Rwandans born since the 1994 genocide know. The Rwandans who remember leaders before him have reason to wonder if they will ever see another: The state’s mighty security apparatus is quietly eloquent, with all those soldiers and police officers routinely patrolling both city streets and the countryside.

Mr. Kagame is up against two innocuous candidates after the national election commission disqualified Diane Rwigara, his strongest opponent, and two other independent contenders. The opposition leader Victoire Ingabire, who was placed under house arrest in the lead-up to the 2010 election, is now in jail serving a dubious 15-year sentence for threatening state security, among other things. Journalists have also been intimidated and stifled; Freedom House categorizes Rwanda as “not free.”

Mr. Kagame wasn’t supposed to run this time because he would be coming up against the two-term limit set by the Constitution. But in 2015 the government proposed an amendment and had it sanctioned in a referendum (roundly criticized by human rights groups), opening the way for Mr. Kagame to stand for re-election this year — and again until 2034.

Burundi was condemned internationally in 2015 after President Pierre Nkurunziza flouted term limits to run for a third mandate. Last year, President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo skirted term restrictions by simply delaying the next election, triggering protests and then a crackdown that led to sanctions against his government. Yet nothing of the sort has happened to Mr. Kagame or his administration despite its ploys to keep him in power basically unchallenged.

Why? Because Mr. Kagame has been masterful at deflecting criticism of his illiberalism by pointing to Rwanda’s economic performance. The country is touted as a model: The government claims that the economy grew by an average of about 8 percent a year between 2001 and 2014, and that the rate of poverty dropped from nearly 57 percent in 2006 to less than 40 percent in 2014. Neither Mr. Nkurunziza nor Mr. Kabila could proffer such results.

Mr. Kagame’s supporters, in Rwanda and beyond, sing to his tune. In a way, they have to. Western donors and international organizations may well prefer democratic values to big-man politics. But having poured great sums of money into Rwanda since the 1994 genocide, they want to be impressed by the headway Mr. Kagame claims to have made — on economic growth and poverty reduction, but also maternal health care and the prosecution of suspected mass killers. Asia has tigers; now Africa has found its lion. Many want to believe that while Mr. Kagame may have been cutting corners on democracy, he has delivered on development.

Has he, though?

In fact, his government’s record is shakier than it looks, including on some of the major achievements it is credited with.

Consider poverty reduction. Back in 2005, I was stationed in Rwanda with a World Bank team, working on a large-scale study of poverty. Six months into it, after we had collected hundreds of survey questionnaires about the well-being of ordinary Rwandans and conducted hundreds of discussions with villagers, the Rwandan security forces seized half of our files on the pretext that our research’s design was tainted by “genocide ideology” — a vague notion supposedly something like sectarianism that the government often invokes to criminalize what it sees as challenges to its authority. After lengthy negotiations between World Bank and Rwandan officials, the project was abandoned. We never determined what the poverty trends were: The information we had collected was destroyed before it could be analyzed.

Matters have hardly improved. Major studies can only be carried out by the Rwandan authorities or under their close supervision. Independent researchers have come to question the government’s methodology for analyzing data.

Officially, the poverty rate decreased by nearly 6 percentage points between 2011 and 2014. But Filip Reyntjens, a Rwanda expert at the University of Antwerp, has argued that it might actually have increased by about 6 percentage points during that period. Several articles published by the Review of African Political Economy also challenge Rwanda’s official poverty figures, as well as its G.D.P. growth rates.

I’m of the view that expanding individual freedoms is essential, not incidental, to a country’s long-term development. As Angus Deaton, a Nobel laureate in economics, said to a Rwandan minister in 2015, “improvements in public health can never be truly secure in nondemocratic states.” But I concede that Rwanda has made remarkable economic progress since facing near-total destruction in 1994, and that some think it is still worth debating the merits of trade-offs between democracy and development.

Whatever one thinks of these issues, however, everyone should be concerned that the Kagame government has been fudging, hiding or selectively presenting the raw facts of its economic record. Rwanda may be forgoing democracy for development only to wind up with no democracy and far less development than many think.

Don’t be fooled by those happy campaign rallies. Rwandans live in fear.

Kagame rally Gakenke

Rwandan President Paul Kagame, left, greets a crowd of supporters as he arrives for a campaign rally on Monday in Gakenke. (Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images)

By Fred MUVUNYI

Fred Muvunyi, a former chairman of the Rwanda Media Commission, is an editor at Deutsche Welle, Germany’s international broadcaster.

On Friday, Rwandan voters will go to the polls and overwhelmingly reelect Paul Kagame as their president. Kagame himself has said that the result is a foregone conclusion. So where does he get his remarkable self-confidence?

One important clue comes from campaign rallies. Thousands of people, joyously singing and dancing, routinely flock to events staged for the incumbent president by the ruling party. There are two other officially allowed candidates, but almost no one shows up to see them speak.

The stark difference is easily explained. Show up at an opposition rally and you can bet that the authorities will note your presence. Attendance at Kagame’s events, by contrast, is expected — since the president has given orders to all local officials to ensure turnout. The key, in both cases, is one simple word: fear. Anyone who doesn’t show loyalty to Kagame is considered to be “an enemy of the state.”

The supporters of the regime sneer at those who claim that Kagame’s popular support is buttressed by intimidation. The president, they say, is genuinely loved by Rwandans for his success in bringing economic growth, reliable health care and a relatively fair court system, all while reducing corruption to levels many other countries would envy. Plus, through sheer force of personality, he has managed to unite the country after the horrific genocide of 1994, in which close to a million Rwandans — overwhelmingly members of the Tutsi minority — were slaughtered in just 100 days.

Kagame’s positive achievements are genuine. But they can also be seen as the more palatable side of an all-encompassing system of social control that knows few equals in the world. Rwanda’s government, led by Kagame’s ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), is a finely meshed organization that reaches down into the smallest villages. Local government officials maintain detailed files on every household, and a dense network of informers keeps track of citizens’ behavior and thinking. Visiting foreigners are rarely aware of this reality, but Rwandans know it well. People from my country often use an idiom in our native language of Kinyarwanda that captures it well: “Even the trees are listening,” they say.

Rwanda has a long history of intrusive government, but it is the experience of genocide — which was finally brought to an end by the invading RPF, then an insurgent group based in neighboring countries — that has given birth to what can only be described as a form of institutionalized paranoia. Kagame and his comrades in the Tutsi-dominated RPF are only too aware that many members of the majority Hutus were once active participants in mass murder. As a result, the current government tends to view any attempt to question the existing system as subversion at best, and often as a first step to a new genocidal conspiracy at worst.

This mentality is reinforced by Kagame’s own background as a former military intelligence officer and rebel leader. During his long years in Ugandan exile, he knew that he and his party would never be able to come to power by peaceful means, and events bore that prediction out. For him, “constructive opposition” is a contradiction in terms. To Kagame and his entourage, criticism always entails a security threat.

Kagame has correspondingly tightened his control of the armed forces. Today, the most respected and outspoken military officers are in prison, exile or dead. To name but one of the most recent examples, Patrick Karegeya, Rwanda’s former intelligence chief, was killed in South African exile on Jan. 1, 2014.

But this grim fate is not restricted to former military men. Journalists, independent businessmen and members of the opposition have all faced various degrees of state-sponsored terror. They range from Charles Ingabire, a reporter who was shot to death in Uganda in 2011, to Pasteur Bizimungu, Kagame’s predecessor as president, who stepped down in 2000, and was later arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of embezzlement, inciting ethnic hatred and attempting to form a militia. His defenders say that his real crime was attempting to form his own opposition party. When Rwandans see what can happen to people who once enjoyed power and prestige, they rightly conclude that they are better off keeping their mouths shut.

In 2012, three years before I was forced to leave for an exile of my own, I had the privilege to pay a visit in prison to Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza. In 2010, Ingabire, an outspoken and eloquent woman, had returned to Rwanda from the Netherlands, where she had lived for the previous 17 years, to challenge Kagame. But, as she told me in a voice strikingly subdued, she had failed to reckon with the nature of the Rwandan regime. After four months in Kigali, she was thrown in jail, where she remains today.

Kagame is smart. He knows how to turn his country’s dark history to his own advantage. When westerners try to criticize him for his failure to uphold human rights, Kagame points out that their countries either failed to prevent the genocide or actively abetted it, skillfully using their own feelings of guilt to silence them. So far it’s been a highly effective strategy. But that doesn’t change the reality that Rwanda is a country where fear reigns supreme.

Source: Washington Post

 

The Government of Rwandan People in Exile: Reshuffle and People’s Tribunal

SAFARI Justin

Mr. Justin SAFARI enters Ministry of Justice which is symbolically led by Déo MUSHAYIDI (in Rwanda’s Prison). The Former Prime Minister, Abdallah AKISHULI becomes the Attorney General of the People’s Tribunal while Ms Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE replaces him keeping at same time the diplomacy portfolio.

DSC_0019

From left: Abdallah AKISHULI, Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE and Thomas NAHIMANA. Photo archives Mininfo GREX.

Press Statement

Cabinet reshuffle within the Government of Rwanda in Exile

  1. By the virtue of the powers conferred upon him by Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Charter governing the Government of the Rwandese People in Exile signed on 23 February 2017 in Paris, France;
  2. Considering the unbecoming behavior of the Rwandan dictator Paul Kagame who rejected the proposals for the urgent need for the opening up of political space in Rwanda made by the Government of the Rwandan people in exile, thus opting de facto for the way of “an absolute monarchy” under the deceptive image of a republic actually emptied of its true substance;
  3. Implementing the resolution of the Government Council of 23 April 2017, which established the “People’s Tribunal” to investigate crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of genocide committed by certain senior political and military officials since 1 October 1990, which until now enjoy unacceptable impunity;
  4. His Excellency the President of the Government of the Rwandese People in Exile, Thomas Nahimana, appointed the High Authorities of the People’s Tribunal as follows:
    1. The Attorney General of the People’s Tribunal: Mr. Abdallah AKISHULI
    2. The Presiding Judge of the People’s Tribunal: Mr. Vénant NKURUNZIZA

5. His Excellency the President of the Rwandan People’s Government in Exile has appointed members of the cabinet of ministers as follows:

    1. Prime Minister: Mrs. Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE
    2. Vice-Prime Minister: Mrs. Nadine Claire KASINGE
    3. Minister of Justice: Mr. Déogratias Mushayidi represented by Minister Justin SAFARI
    4. Minister of Culture, Family and Women Empowerment: Mrs. Victoire INGABIRE UMUHOZA represented by Mrs. Nadine Claire KASINGE
    5. Minister of Information: Mr. Chaste GAHUNDE
    6. Minister of Education: Mrs. Chantal MUKAMANA MUTEGA
    7. Minister of Interior and Local Development: Mr. Daniel NDUWIMANA
    8. Minister of Commerce and Finance: Mrs. Marine UWIMANA
    9. Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Land: Mr. Jean Léonard SEBURANGA
    10. Minister of Refugee Condition and Eradication of Causes of Asylum: Mrs. Virginie NAKURE
    11. Minister of Infrastructure and Habitat: Reverend Father Gaspard NTAKIRUTIMANA
    12. Minister of Health and Citizen’s Well-fare: Mrs. Spéciose MUJAWAYEZU

6. GOVERNMENTSPOKESPERSONS :

  1. Chaste GAHUNDE
  2. Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE
  3. Marine UWIMANA

Done in Paris on July 31, 2017
Chaste GAHUNDE
Minister of Information, Government Spokesperson

IMG-20170227-WA0049

EU supports multilateral global governance, based on international law, human rights and strong international institutions

Mogherini

EU High representative Federica MOGHERINI

Declaration by the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, on behalf of the European Union on the occasion of the Day of International Criminal Justice, 17 July 2017

The 17th of July marks the date of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. This day is dedicated to celebrating the developments and achievements of international criminal justice institutions and to remind us that we need to continue working, at both national and international levels, to ensure that the perpetrators of the most serious crimes are brought to justice and held to account.

On this occasion, the European Union and its Member States reaffirm their full support to the International Criminal Court and to the strengthening of an international criminal justice system committed to deter the commission of crimes, to fight impunity and to ensure the protection of the victims’ rights.

Justice is one of the core elements towards reconciliation and sustainable peace. Without justice, the most heinous crimes go unpunished, victims are unable to obtain redress and peace remains an elusive goal, since impunity generates more hatred, leading to acts of revenge and more suffering.

The European Union is one of the main donors in support of justice sector reform worldwide, strengthening law enforcement and justice institutions, promoting independent and impartial justice, and supporting access to justice for all. Since 2000, we have committed €37 million in direct support of the International Criminal Court.

The European Union has been also supporting transitional justice initiatives and international justice mechanisms related to specific countries. In the case of Syria, the EU has recently allocated funding amounting to €1,5 million to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in Syria. The EU calls on the international community to support to the Mechanism, including through adequate financial means, to ensure that it would be able to start work as soon as possible and fulfil its mandate, in line with the principles of universality and at the highest level of professionalism.

The European Union will continue to fully support multilateral global governance, based on international law, human rights and strong international institutions. In this regard, we remain committed to advance our fight against impunity, and to promote the universal ratification of the Rome Statute.

Source: European Union

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE: Remaniement ministériel au sein du gouvernement du peuple rwandais en exil

SAFARI Justin

Monsieur Justin SAFARI est le nouveau Ministre au sein du Ministère de la Justice de Monsieur Déo MUSHAYIDI. L’ancien Premier Ministre, Abdallah AKISHULI cède la place à Mme Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE pour devenir le Procureur général du Tribunal du Peuple dont la mission est juger les crimes contre l’humanité, crimes de guerre et de génocide commis par les hautes autorités militaires et politiques qui jusq’aujourd’hui jouissent d’une impunité inacceptable.

 Communiqué de Presse

  1. En vertu des pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés par les articles 14, 15 et 16 de la Charte régissant le Gouvernement du Peuple Rwandais en Exil signé en date du 23 février 2017 à Paris en France ;
  2. Tenant compte du comportement indigne du dictateur rwandais Paul Kagame qui a rejeté les propositions en rapport avec l’urgente nécessité de l’ouverture de l’espace politique au Rwanda formulées par le Gouvernement du peuple rwandais en exil, optant de facto pour la voie « d’une monarchie absolue » sous les dehors trompeurs d’une république en réalité vidée de sa substance ;
  3. Mettant en application la résolution du conseil gouvernemental du 23 avril 2017 qui a institué le « Tribunal du Peuple » avec mission de juger les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre et crimes de génocide commis par certains hauts responsables politiques et militaires depuis le 1 octobre 1990 qui, jusqu’aujourd’hui, jouissent d’une impunité inacceptable ;
  4. Son Excellence le Président du Gouvernement du peuple rwandais en exil, Thomas Nahimana, a nommé les hautes autorités du « Tribunal du Peuple » comme suit :
  • Le Procureur Général du « Tribunal du Peuple » : Monsieur Abdallah AKISHULI
  • Le Juge Président du « Tribunal du Peuple » : Monsieur Vénant NKURUNZIZA

5. Son Excellence le Président du Gouvernement du peuple rwandais en exil a remanié le gouvernement comme suit :

  1. Premier Ministre : Madame Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE
  2. Vice – Premier Ministre : Madame Nadine Claire KASINGE
  3. Ministre de la Justice : Monsieur Déogratias MUSHAYIDI représenté par le Ministre Justin SAFARI
  4. Ministre de la Culture, Famille et Promotion de la Condition Féminine : Madame Victoire INGABIRE UMUHOZA représentée par Madame Nadine Claire KASINGE
  5. Ministre de l’Information : Monsieur Chaste GAHUNDE
  6. Ministre de l’Education : Madame Chantal MUKAMANA MUTEGA
  7. Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement local : Monsieur Daniel NDUWIMANA
  8. Ministre du Commerce et des Finances : Madame Marine UWIMANA
  9. Ministre de l’Agriculture, Elevage et des Terres : Monsieur Jean Léonard SEBURANGA
  10. Ministre de la Condition des Réfugiés et Eradication des Causes de l’Asile : Madame Virginie NAKURE
  11. Ministre de l’Infrastructure et Habitat : Révérend Père Gaspard NTAKIRUTIMANA
  12. Ministre de la Santé et du Bien-être du citoyen : Madame Spéciose MUJAWAYEZU

DSC_0019

 De gauche à droite: Abdallah AKISHULI? Procureur général, Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE, Premier Ministre et Thomas NAHIMANA, Président .

6. LES PORTE-PAROLES DU GOUVERNEMENT :

  1. Monsieur Chaste GAHUNDE
  2. Madame Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE
  3. Madame Marine UWIMANA

 

Fait à Paris le 31/07/17

Chaste GAHUNDE
Ministre de l’Information, Porte-Parole du Gouvernement

IMG-20170227-WA0049

IVUGURURWA RYA GUVERINOMA Y’URWANDA IKORERA MU BUHUNGIRO

DSC_0019

Uhereye i bumoso: Bwana Abdallah AKISHULI, umushinjacyaha mukuru w’urukiko rwa rubanda, Madame Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE, Ministre w’intebe, Padiri Thomas NAHIMANA, Perezida.

Itangazo rigenewe Itangazamakuru

IVUGURURWA RYA GUVERINOMA Y’URWANDA IKORERA MU BUHUNGIRO

  1. Ashingiye ku bubasha ahabwa na « CHARTE » igenga Guverinoma y’u Rwanda ikorera mu buhungiro yasinyiwe i Paris taliki ya 23 Gashyantare 2017 cyane cyane mu ngingo zayo 14,15 na 16 ;
  2. Ashingiye ku myitwarire igayitse y’Umunyagitugu Paul Kagame wakomeje kunangira umutima ntiyite ku nama nziza yo gukingura urubuga rwa politiki yagiriwe na Guverinoma ya rubanda ikorera mu buhungiro ahubwo akiyemeza kugundira ubutegetsi mu nyungu ze bwite agamije kuzabukurwaho n’urupfu gusa ;
  3. Ashingiye ku byemezo by’inama ya Guverinoma ya rubanda yo kuwa 23/04/2017 yashyizeho « Urukiko Rwa Rubanda » rushinzwe gukurikirana « abayobozi » bashinjwa ibyaha by’intambara, ibyibasiye inyoko-muntu n’ibyaha bya jenoside byakorewe abanyarwanda guhera taliki ya 1 Ukwakira 1990, bikaba kugeza ubu bitarahanwa n’inkiko ;
  4. Nyakubahwa Perezida wa Guverinoma y’u Rwanda ikorera mu buhungiro Padiri Thomas NAHIMANA yashyizeho  abayobozi b’inzego nkuru z’ « Urukiko Rwa Rubanda » ku buryo bukurikira:
    1. Umushinjacyaha Mukuru w’Urukiko rwa Rubanda (Procureur Général): Bwana Abdallah AKISHULI
    2. Umucamanza Mukuru w’Urukiko rwa Rubanda: Bwana Vénant NKURUNZIZA
  5. Nyakubahwa Perezida wa Guverinoma y’u Rwanda Padiri Thomas NAHIMANA ikorera mu buhungiro yashyize mu myanya aba Ministre ku buryo bukurikira:
    1. Ministre w’Intebe ufite n’Ububanyi n’Amahanga mu nshingano : Madame Immaculée Kansiime UWIZEYE
    2. Ministre w’Intebe wungirije: Madame Nadine Claire KASINGE
    3. Minisitiri w’Ubutabera: Bwana Déogratias Mushayidi uhagarariwe na Ministre Justin SAFARI

SAFARI Justin

Min.Justin SAFARI (Kentuchy, USA)

4. Minisitiri w’Umuco, Umuryango, Guteza imbere umwari n’umutegarugori: Madame Victoire INGABIRE UMUHOZA uhagarariwe na Madame Nadine Claire KASINGE

5. Minisitiri w’Itangazamakuru : Bwana Chaste GAHUNDE

6. Ministre w’Uburezi : Madame Chantal MUKAMANA MUTEGA

7. Minisitiri w’Ubutegetsi bw’igihugu n’Iterambere ry’Umurenge: Bwana Daniel NDUWIMANA

8. Minisitiri w’Imari n’Ubucuruzi: Madame Marine UWIMANA

9. Minisitiri w’Ubuhinzi, Ubworozi n’Ubutaka : Bwana Jean Léonard SEBURANGA

10. Minisitiri ushinzwe Kurengera Impunzi no gukemura ikibazo gitera ubuhunzi : Madame Virginie NAKURE

11. Minisitiri w’Ibikorwa-remezo n’Imiturire : Padiri Gaspard NTAKIRUTIMANA

12. Minisitiri w’Ubuzima n’Imibereho myiza y’Abaturage : Madame Spéciose MUJAWAYEZU

ABAVUGIZI BA GUVERINOMA :

  1. Bwana Chaste GAHUNDE
  2. Madame Immaculée KANSIIME UWIZEYE
  3. Madame Marine UWIMANA

Bikorewe i Paris tariki ya 31/07/17
Chaste GAHUNDE
Minisitiri ushinzwe itangazamakuru, umuvugizi wa Guverinoma

IMG-20170227-WA0049

Short of arguments, Rwanda Diplomacy Chief threatens the critics!

LMUs

This is what Minister Louise Mushikiwabo tweeted in Kinyarwanda. The derogatory, very racist tweet was aimed at whites and other non-whites who have been critical of the regime she works for as Foreign Minister, led by dictator Paul Kagame.

I am sick and tired of utuzungu said Mushikiwabo. In Kinyarwanda, Umuzungu means a white person. When you replace the first 3 letters “umu” by “utu”, then the word becomes pejorative. It is a common way of formulating an insult  in Kinyarwanda. In this case it means that those whites are subhumans, small (insignificant)  and beneath her. Rwandans do this a lot. They call people they don’t like subhumans. Before the genocide, Tutsis were called cockroaches and subhumans. It is sad that Rwanda’s Foreign Affairs Minister used the same language, same rhetoric as genocidaires. Of all people, Minister Mushikiwabo should know how labeling other races subhumans simply because they shed some light on your government’s human rights abuses is wrong. Instead of refuting those accusatory reports by facts, she resulted to attacks and insults. She chose Kinyarwanda hoping they will never know maybe!

Here is more Kinyarwanda lesson. Abagabo means men. If you want to insult a bunch of men, you can call them utugabo. It is a disrespectful way of saying that they are a bunch of useless nobodies. In Rwandan culture, there is no grave insult than this, especially when this insult is uttered by a woman. Rwanda is still a society where a woman is supposed be genteel and to have ladylike behavior all the time especially the bourgeoisie and higher ups.

The kind of language Minister Mushikiwabo used, normally is for street walkers and thugs. It is the equivalent of ghetto or hood talk in the US. This is why the tweet was scandalous. Many Rwandans were flabbergasted even shocked by that bad language coming from someone in charge of diplomacy and foreign relations, the government spokeswoman. A woman who uses that kind of language in Rwanda is called “inshinzi” (Huchi mama, vulgar with no self worth) and it is normally not proper for a high ranking official to use that kind of language!

Minister Mushikiwabo accused those whites she qualified of subhumans of writing “amateshwa” about Rwanda. Here she was referring to recent reports condemning human rights abuses by the government of dictator Paul Kagame. In Kinyarwanda amateshwa means rubbish, nonsense, words coming out of a mouth of someone who is stupid, dumb, non important, demented, someone so irrelevant that you have no time for whatever they are saying.

Finally, Mushikiwabo asked “utuzungu”, those insignificant white subhumans who put them in charge of Africa? They need to butt out of african affairs she said!

Source: Iwacuheza.com

Learn How to Disagree

Grahams_Hierarchy_of_Disagreement1-449x337

Graham’s Hierarchy of disagreement

How to disagree?

The web is turning writing into a conversation. Twenty years ago, writers wrote and readers read. The web lets readers respond, and increasingly they do—in comment threads, on forums, and in their own blog posts.

Many who respond to something disagree with it. That’s to be expected. Agreeing tends to motivate people less than disagreeing. And when you agree there’s less to say. You could expand on something the author said, but he has probably already explored the most interesting implications. When you disagree you’re entering territory he may not have explored.

The result is there’s a lot more disagreeing going on, especially measured by the word. That doesn’t mean people are getting angrier. The structural change in the way we communicate is enough to account for it. But though it’s not anger that’s driving the increase in disagreement, there’s a danger that the increase in disagreement will make people angrier. Particularly online, where it’s easy to say things you’d never say face to face.

If we’re all going to be disagreeing more, we should be careful to do it well. What does it mean to disagree well? Most readers can tell the difference between mere name-calling and a carefully reasoned refutation, but I think it would help to put names on the intermediate stages. So here’s an attempt at a disagreement hierarchy:

DH0. Name-calling.

This is the lowest form of disagreement, and probably also the most common. We’ve all seen comments like this:

u r a fag!!!!!!!!!!

But it’s important to realize that more articulate name-calling has just as little weight. A comment like

The author is a self-important dilettante.

is really nothing more than a pretentious version of “u r a fag.”

DH1. Ad Hominem.

An ad hominem attack is not quite as weak as mere name-calling. It might actually carry some weight. For example, if a senator wrote an article saying senators’ salaries should be increased, one could respond:

Of course he would say that. He’s a senator.

This wouldn’t refute the author’s argument, but it may at least be relevant to the case. It’s still a very weak form of disagreement, though. If there’s something wrong with the senator’s argument, you should say what it is; and if there isn’t, what difference does it make that he’s a senator?

Saying that an author lacks the authority to write about a topic is a variant of ad hominem—and a particularly useless sort, because good ideas often come from outsiders. The question is whether the author is correct or not. If his lack of authority caused him to make mistakes, point those out. And if it didn’t, it’s not a problem.

DH2. Responding to Tone.

The next level up we start to see responses to the writing, rather than the writer. The lowest form of these is to disagree with the author’s tone. E.g.

I can’t believe the author dismisses intelligent design in such a cavalier fashion.

Though better than attacking the author, this is still a weak form of disagreement. It matters much more whether the author is wrong or right than what his tone is. Especially since tone is so hard to judge. Someone who has a chip on their shoulder about some topic might be offended by a tone that to other readers seemed neutral.

So if the worst thing you can say about something is to criticize its tone, you’re not saying much. Is the author flippant, but correct? Better that than grave and wrong. And if the author is incorrect somewhere, say where.

DH3. Contradiction.

In this stage we finally get responses to what was said, rather than how or by whom. The lowest form of response to an argument is simply to state the opposing case, with little or no supporting evidence.

This is often combined with DH2 statements, as in:

I can’t believe the author dismisses intelligent design in such a cavalier fashion. Intelligent design is a legitimate scientific theory.

Contradiction can sometimes have some weight. Sometimes merely seeing the opposing case stated explicitly is enough to see that it’s right. But usually evidence will help.

DH4. Counterargument.

At level 4 we reach the first form of convincing disagreement: counterargument. Forms up to this point can usually be ignored as proving nothing. Counterargument might prove something. The problem is, it’s hard to say exactly what.

Counterargument is contradiction plus reasoning and/or evidence. When aimed squarely at the original argument, it can be convincing. But unfortunately it’s common for counterarguments to be aimed at something slightly different. More often than not, two people arguing passionately about something are actually arguing about two different things. Sometimes they even agree with one another, but are so caught up in their squabble they don’t realize it.

There could be a legitimate reason for arguing against something slightly different from what the original author said: when you feel they missed the heart of the matter. But when you do that, you should say explicitly you’re doing it.

DH5. Refutation.

The most convincing form of disagreement is refutation. It’s also the rarest, because it’s the most work. Indeed, the disagreement hierarchy forms a kind of pyramid, in the sense that the higher you go the fewer instances you find.

To refute someone you probably have to quote them. You have to find a “smoking gun,” a passage in whatever you disagree with that you feel is mistaken, and then explain why it’s mistaken. If you can’t find an actual quote to disagree with, you may be arguing with a straw man.

While refutation generally entails quoting, quoting doesn’t necessarily imply refutation. Some writers quote parts of things they disagree with to give the appearance of legitimate refutation, then follow with a response as low as DH3 or even DH0.

DH6. Refuting the Central Point.

The force of a refutation depends on what you refute. The most powerful form of disagreement is to refute someone’s central point.

Even as high as DH5 we still sometimes see deliberate dishonesty, as when someone picks out minor points of an argument and refutes those. Sometimes the spirit in which this is done makes it more of a sophisticated form of ad hominem than actual refutation. For example, correcting someone’s grammar, or harping on minor mistakes in names or numbers. Unless the opposing argument actually depends on such things, the only purpose of correcting them is to discredit one’s opponent.

Truly refuting something requires one to refute its central point, or at least one of them. And that means one has to commit explicitly to what the central point is. So a truly effective refutation would look like:

The author’s main point seems to be x. As he says:

<quotation>

But this is wrong for the following reasons…

The quotation you point out as mistaken need not be the actual statement of the author’s main point. It’s enough to refute something it depends upon.

What It Means

Now we have a way of classifying forms of disagreement. What good is it? One thing the disagreement hierarchy doesn’t give us is a way of picking a winner. DH levels merely describe the form of a statement, not whether it’s correct. A DH6 response could still be completely mistaken.

But while DH levels don’t set a lower bound on the convincingness of a reply, they do set an upper bound. A DH6 response might be unconvincing, but a DH2 or lower response is always unconvincing.

The most obvious advantage of classifying the forms of disagreement is that it will help people to evaluate what they read. In particular, it will help them to see through intellectually dishonest arguments. An eloquent speaker or writer can give the impression of vanquishing an opponent merely by using forceful words. In fact that is probably the defining quality of a demagogue. By giving names to the different forms of disagreement, we give critical readers a pin for popping such balloons.

Such labels may help writers too. Most intellectual dishonesty is unintentional. Someone arguing against the tone of something he disagrees with may believe he’s really saying something. Zooming out and seeing his current position on the disagreement hierarchy may inspire him to try moving up to counterargument or refutation.

But the greatest benefit of disagreeing well is not just that it will make conversations better, but that it will make the people who have them happier. If you study conversations, you find there is a lot more meanness down in DH1 than up in DH6. You don’t have to be mean when you have a real point to make. In fact, you don’t want to. If you have something real to say, being mean just gets in the way.

If moving up the disagreement hierarchy makes people less mean, that will make most of them happier. Most people don’t really enjoy being mean; they do it because they can’t help it.

Thanks to Trevor Blackwell and Jessica Livingston for reading drafts of this.

Paul Graham, March 2008

Source: How to disagree

Faking it: The Rwandan GDP Growth Myth

This is a follow up to the blog-post, which was published on roape.net on 31 May, 2017, in which we showed that poverty increased by between 5 and 7 percentage points between 2010 and 2014 in Rwanda, even as the government claims it decreased by 6 percentage points. The blogpost concluded that the information emerging from the household survey data appeared to be incompatible with the official figures on economic growth, and invited researchers to more closely scrutinize the data coming out of the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR). Indeed, with agriculture accounting for more than one third of GDP and two thirds of the workforce, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which total GDP growth could average between 6% and 8% annual growth, while incomes in the agricultural sector appear to be decreasing for a substantial proportion of farmers. This blogpost tries to substantiate those claims using the NISR’s Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV) data as well as looking at more recent trends in relevant macroeconomic variables.

According to economic theory, GDP per capita measured from National Account Statistics (NAS) should be equivalent to average income or consumption measured from Household Surveys (HHS). In practice, this is rarely the case because of measurement errors. For instance, households tend to deliberately under-report earnings, while NAS have trouble capturing illicit and informal economic activity (read Ken Simler’s 2008 paper on this theme). Even when there are differences in levels of income estimated by the two methods, however, Martin Ravallion (2003) concludes that, “NAS consumption growth rate is an unbiased predictor of the HHS consumption growth rate.” Furthermore, he finds that NAS/HHS estimates should converge over time as the economy develops and becomes more formalized.[1]

In figure 1 below, we show the evolution of average household consumption between 2000 and 2013 in Rwanda, as estimated from the EICV datasets and nominal GDP per capita in local currency units, as reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators databank. [2] As the graph shows, estimates of average income/consumption from the EICV and national accounts were almost identical in 2000 and 2005, and started to grow apart thereafter. By 2013, the national account estimate was more than 50% higher than the average consumption estimated from the EICV. This does not constitute incontrovertible proof that GDP growth rates have been over-estimated in Rwanda, since there are different factors listed above that could explain such discrepancies. But it does strongly suggest that something is amiss in Rwanda’s GDP growth figures. At the very least, it does raise serious questions about the reliability of national account statistics, which the government and donors rely on to claim the success of their policies. As mentioned in our previous blogpost, GDP figures are easier to manipulate than household survey data, as the Greek case famously showed a few years back.

Figure 1: GDP per capita vs. Average EICV consumption

Source: EICV1-4, World Bank WDI

Even if we were to conclude that growth data have not been manipulated in the past, there are reasons to be concerned about the current performance of the Rwandan economy. The most recent growth data coming out of Rwanda shows that economic growth slowed to its lowest level since 2002 (1.7%) in the first quarter of 2017. With a population growth rate of 3% per year, this means that Rwanda’s GDP per capita growth rate is now effectively negative, even according to the NISR’s own estimates (see figure 2 below).

Figure 2: GDP Annual Growth Rate

Source: tradingeconomics.com

This should come as no surprise to those who have paid attention to the facts behind the dazzling numbers that Rwanda and its donors like to boast about. While there has been undeniable progress since the war, much of the improvements we see in Kigali today are cosmetic and driven by the government’s obsession to portray an image of success rather than to lay the foundations of lasting economic growth. As we mentioned in the previous blogpost, much of the investments have been financed with public debt, leading to a surge in external debt levels (see figure 3 – remember that actual debt to GDP ratios may be even higher, if GDP has been overestimated as our analysis suggests).

Figure 3: Debt to GDP

Source: tradingeconomics.com

This would all be fine, if the investments had been strategically targeted at growth areas aimed at leapfrogging development Korean style. But to date, the vast majority of investments have gone into cosmetic – and crucially loss-making – prestige projects, such as the Kigali Convention Centre, Rwanda Air, Kigali skyscrapers and luxury housing units for the non-existent Rwandan upper-middle class. Even if these investments were not making a loss, this would arguably be a questionable use of public resources, since they are all highly regressive and aimed at subsidizing the super-rich or foreign clients.  Rather than enabling economic development, these projects cost the Rwandan taxpayer dearly in running costs and take away precious resources from more pressing areas of development, such as the agricultural sector. The result of these irresponsible investments is beginning to  be felt. For the first time in recent years, capital account flows to Rwanda were negative by a large margin in 2016, indicating that investors may be starting to put their assets abroad (see figure 4 below).

Figure 4: Capital Flows

Source: tradingeconomics.com

At the same time, Rwanda’s current account deficit reached a whopping 16.6% of GDP, even as the government put in place draconian measures to restrict imports (see figure 5)

Figure 5: Current Account

Source: tradingeconomics.com

With such economic fundamentals, it is not surprising that the value of the Rwandan franc has almost been halved in the past few years (see figure 6 below):

Figure 6: Rwf/ USD exchange rate

Source: tradingeconomics.com

The situation is likely to get worse, not better, over the coming years as even larger prestige projects come online and existing ones start accumulating more losses. The East African reported on 3 July that “Rwanda’s foreign reserves are expected to fall below the East African Community’s convergence criterion of four months [of imports] in the coming year” and may fall below IMF’s critical threshold of three months of imports.

The conclusion of this brief analysis is that if there ever was a Rwandan economic miracle it has probably fizzled out some time ago and is likely to come crashing down very soon. At the very least, the data shows that the development strategy adopted by the Rwandan government is risky in the extreme, bordering on reckless. The closest example we can find in recent history of similar policies is Mobutu’s Zaire that squandered the country’s resources on space projects, nuclear power plants and a Concord airplane. As outlandish as they seem today, these projects also helped to give Mobutu an image of success up until the 1970s (remember the Rumble in the Jungle?) But Rwanda’s PR machine has even surpassed Mobutu’s, having managed to keep the narrative of success going for all these years even as evidence to the contrary has been in plain sight, or just below the surface waiting to be scratched. Even today, there is not a single article in the press (even the critical ones) that does not mention Rwanda’s alleged economic success, and its low levels of corruption – forgetting to mention that close associates of Kagame appeared in the Panama Papers last year and a transparency international coordinator was assassinated.

The authors of this article have asked for anonymity. 

Featured Photograph: Kigali Convention Centre dome (2014)

Notes

[1] Ravallion, M. 2003. “Measuring Aggregate Welfare in Developing Countries: How Well do National Accounts and Surveys Agree?” Review of Economics and Statistics 85(3): 645–652

[2] The do-files required to estimate average household consumption are the same ones that were published in the previous blogpost. Once the do-file has run its course, you simply need to run the following command to obtain average household consumption: svy: mean adtot. For EICV2 use this do-file (click here to download the file). For EICV1, we used the figures in Table 2, page 13 in: McKay, A. (2015). The recent evolution of consumption poverty in Rwanda (No. 2015/125). WIDER Working Paper.

Source: A Review Of African Political Economy (ROAPE)

The Evidence Mounts: Poverty, Inflation and Rwanda

By Sam Desiere

In a recent blogpost an anonymous researcher on roape.net showed that poverty in Rwanda has increased from 2011 to 2014 by 5 percentage points. This contradicts the official poverty statistics and narrative, which claim that poverty decreased by 5.8 percentage points, namely from 44.9% in 2011 to 39.1% in 2014 (NISR, 2015). Importantly, the author published the Stata-files used to analyse the data of the EICV 3 and EICV 4 household surveys, enabling other researchers to verify his claims.

Recently, I also calculated trends in poverty using the same datasets. Although I used a slightly different (and, arguably, less sophisticated) methodology, the results confirm that poverty did not decrease. In addition, I show that the poverty trends are very sensitive to the inflation rate used. With an inflation of 16.7% (as reported by the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, NISR), poverty indeed decreased by at least 5 percentage points. With an inflation rate of 30% – which is in my view more in line with the ‘real’ inflation rate – my estimates show that poverty increased by 1.2 percentage points.

The fact that two researchers arrive – independently from each other – at the same conclusion, strengthens my belief that the EICV surveys show that poverty in Rwanda has increased. This has important implications for the current debate about (rural) policies in Rwanda, but I leave a discussion of these implications to researchers and policy makers more familiar with the reality on the ground and focus in this blogpost on the technical aspects of estimating poverty trends.

In this this post, I briefly describe my methodology and key findings and discuss (food) price inflation, which turns out to be a critical parameter. The Stata do-files required to replicate my findings can be found here.

Methodology

Rwanda’s poverty estimates are based on the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV by their French acronym), which are conducted every three years. I used data from EICV 3, conducted in 2010/11 and EICV 4, conducted in 2013/14, which are made publicly available by the NISR. More specifically, I used the modules on food consumption purchased on the market and food consumption from own production. In both waves, the questionnaire of both modules is nearly identical. Food consumption is reported for more than 100 food items.

Unlike the anonymous researcher, I did not use the modules on non-food expenditure. I did so for two reasons. First, the NISR reports that most households spend over 60% of their budget on food. Hence, food expenditure is a good proxy of poverty. Second, non-food expenditure would require some additional data cleaning, which requires additional assumptions. Hence, I simply calculated food expenditure in both waves.

The meta-data of EICV 4 (available on NISR’s website) clearly stipulates that each sampled household in Kigali was visited 11 times over a period of 33 days. The modules on food consumption were administered during every visit. Rural households were visited 8 times over a period of 16 days. The meta-data of EICV 3, however, does not provide information on the number of times a household was visited. I simply assumed that the same methodology, for both rural and urban households, was followed in wave 3 as in wave 4. If this assumption is wrong – something I could not check – the results presented below will be erroneous.

In both waves, households reported how much they had spent on food purchased on the market by food item since the previous visit of the enumerator. I simply added up expenditure on all food items. Households also reported how much they had consumed from own production. Converting the consumption from own production in monetary values was more challenging. Households typically reported consumption from own production in kg. Some households also reported in the same module how much they would have paid on the market for this food item. I used this information to calculate the median, national price for each food item and used this price to convert consumption from own production in its monetary value. Since relatively few households reported prices, I did not attempt to calculate region specific prices nor did I correct for price seasonality. On this point my methodology differs from the anonymous researcher, who calculated a Laspeyres price index to account for spatial and temporal price variation.

To verify my assumptions, I checked whether my estimates of food expenditure are correlated with the household poverty status as reported by the NISR and included as a separate variable in the datasets. In both waves, food expenditure was lower for households classified by the NISR as extremely poor compared to household classified as poor, and the expenditure of this group was in turn lower than the expenditure of non-poor households. These results, available upon request, confirm that my assumptions are at least partially similar to the assumptions of the NISR.

Food expenditure can only be compared between the waves if the food inflation rate between 2010/11 and 2013/14 is known. I used two different inflation rates. First, I used an inflation rate of 16.7%, which is reported by the NISR (NISR, 2016, p. 43). Second, I estimated inflation based on food prices reported by the respondents, which I also used to convert food consumption from own production in monetary values. Inflation is then defined as a weighted average of the price increase of nine important crops. I used the same weights as those used by NISR to construct the 2013/14 adjusted food poverty line (NISR, 2015, table B4, p. 38). These estimates of inflation will be discussed in greater detail below.

Since I did not calculate total expenditure, but only food expenditure, I could not use the poverty lines proposed by the NISR. I therefore followed the ‘inverse’ methodology. First, I assumed that the NISR correctly estimated poverty in 2010/11 (44.9%) and used this information to determine the food expenditure threshold in 2010/11 prices that corresponds with this poverty rate. Second, I deflated food expenditure in 2013/14 using two different inflation rates, namely 16.7% and 30%. The first inflation rate corresponds with the inflation rate used by the NISR and thus allows me to replicate the findings of the NISR. The second inflation rate corresponds with my own estimate of inflation using the price data from EICV 3 and EICV 4. Third, I used the food expenditure threshold as an alternative to a poverty line to estimate the poverty rate in 2013/14. This approach is valid because I am not interested in ‘absolute’ poverty figures, but only in poverty trends.

In all analyses, I used the population weights to make the results nationally representative.

Results

Poverty trends

Using the EICV 3 and EICV 4 datasets, I calculated food expenditure per adult equivalent, respectively in 2010/11 prices and 2013/2014 prices. In order to estimate poverty trends, food expenditure in 2013/14 has to be deflated to express it 2010/11 prices. Poverty trends are very sensitive to the inflation rate used to deflate food expenditure. Results are presented for two inflation rates: (1) an inflation rate of 16.7% as reported by NISR and (2) an inflation rate of 30%, which is at the lower end of my inflation estimates based on ESOKO price data or EICV price data (see below for a discussion of inflation).

Figure 1 shows cumulative frequency distributions of food expenditure for these two situations, while table 1 summarizes poverty trends

With an inflation rate of 16.7% (left panel, figure 1), real food expenditure per adult equivalent increased for all households from 2010/11 to 2013/14 and, as a result, poverty decreased. Assuming a poverty rate of 44.9% in 2010/11 (which corresponds to a food poverty line of 100,232 RWF per adult equivalent), poverty decreased by 7.9 percentage points. This poverty reduction is even more pronounced than reported by official statistics, which states than poverty decreased by 5.8 percentage points.

With an inflation rate of 30% (right panel, figure 1), food expenditure does no longer increase between 2011 and 2014 for all households. Again assuming that poverty is 44.9% in 2010/11, poverty even increased by 1.2 percentage points.

Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of food expenditure per adult equivalent for EICV 3 and EICV 4 for an inflation rate of 16.7% and 30%

Table 1: Poverty trends in function of the inflation rate

  Inflation: 16.7% Inflation: 30%
Poor HH EICV 3 (official statistics) 44.9% 44.9%
Poor HH EICV 4 (own estimates) 37.4% 46.1%
Trends in poverty (percentage points) -7.5 +1.2

In sum, the poverty trends are very sensitive to the inflation rate. With an inflation of 16.7% from 2011-2014, poverty decreased by at least 5 percentage points, which is in line with the official reports. With an inflation rate of 30%, poverty does not decrease. The question thus boils down to an accurate estimation of the inflation rate between 2011 and 2014.

Inflation rate

The EICV survey is not an ideal dataset to estimate inflation, because it does not contain much information on food prices. As explained earlier, some households report prices for those food items consumed from own production. This does not only mean that the number of observations is relatively limited, but also that households report prices of those items they did not buy on the market. I nevertheless used this information to calculate mean and median average prices by food item. I calculated national averages without taking into account price seasonality or regional price differences. In order to estimate ‘average’ inflation, a weighted average is taken over nine crops. The weights are proportional to the weights used for the construction of the 2013/14 adjusted food poverty line (NISR, 2015, table B4, p. 38). These nine crops account for 86% of the total calorific intake of the food basket. Two crops dominate this index: cassava (fermented) (weight: 38%) and dry beans (weight: 25%).

Figure 2 shows the increase in mean and median prices between 2010/11 and 2013/14 for nine crops, while the horizontal lines indicate the weighted average. The increase in median prices ranges from 10% for sorghum to 50% for cassava (both flour and roots). Median and mean inflation are 33% and 42%, respectively. This corresponds to an annual inflation of 9.5% and 12.5%, respectively.

Figure 2: Price increase for nine crops from 2010/11 to 3013/14 (mean and median prices)

 

These inflation estimates are substantially higher than the ones reported by NISR, which states that food prices increased by 16.7% between Jan 2011 and Jan 2014 (NISR, 2016, p. 43). Moreover, the estimates based on the EICV surveys are remarkably similar to the estimates based on detailed ESOKO price data, where I estimated inflation at 30.5% over the 2011-2014 period (details not reported here).

In sum, I believe that the ‘real’ food inflation rate is substantially higher than the one used by NISR to estimate poverty trends. This probably explains why I find that poverty increased, while the NISR reported that poverty decreased. These findings raise concerns, not only for Rwanda’s (rural) policies, but also for international donors that have presented Rwanda as a model for development because of the supposedly strong poverty reductions.

Sam Desiere is currently a senior researcher at HIVA, the research institute for work and society of the University of Leuven, Belgium. In 2015 he obtained a PhD in agricultural economics from Ghent University, Belgium, which focused on data quality of household surveys in developing countries.

Featured Photograph: As part of the DFID funded Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP), Rwanda’s flagship Social Protection Programme, women and men in northern Rwanda work on a public works site in 2012, building terraces to prevent soil erosion

Source: A Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE)